Syllabus
The aim of this seminar is to explore the foundations of the relationship between political representation and accountability. We will do so working through some of the classic as well as more recent work on the political economy of accountability.

Requirements:

Students are expected to have taken a graduate introduction to game theory or to have a working knowledge of basic game-theoretic concepts.

Those who are taking the seminar for credit will be expected to write a seminar paper (15-20p) and three short (5p) responses to the weekly readings.

Sequence of Readings (grouped by topics)

I. The setting and some background
Besley, Timothy. 2006. *Principled Agents*, Oxford UP, Ch.1, 2

II. Pure Moral Hazard

III. Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Career Concerns

IV. Politicians as Policy Experts and Accountability to Imperfectly Informed Voters

V. Term Limits

VI. Corruption, Private Goods, and Institutional Variation

VII. Electoral Competition and Accountability


VIII. **Media and Accountability**

Stromberg and Snyder. 2010

Besley and Prat. 2006.